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BY EDWARD WITTEN
In everyday life, a string—such as a shoelace—is usually usedto secure something or hold it in place. When we tie a knot,
the purpose is to help the string do its job. All too often, we run
into a complicated and tangled mess of string, but ordinarily this
happens by mistake.
The term “knot” as it is used by mathematicians is abstracted
from this experience just a little bit. A knot in the mathe-
matical sense is a possibly tangled loop, freely floating in
ordinary space. Thus, mathematicians study the tangle itself.
A typical knot in the mathematical sense is shown in Figure
1. Hopefully, this picture reminds us of something we know
from everyday life. It can be quite hard to make sense of a
tangled piece of string—to decide whether it can be untan-
gled and if so how. It is equally hard to decide if two tangles
are equivalent.
Such questions might not sound like mathematics, if one is
accustomed to thinking that mathematics is about adding, subtracting, multiplying,
and dividing. But actually, in the twentieth century, mathematicians developed a
rather deep theory of knots, with surprising ways to answer questions like whether a
given tangle can be untangled.
But why—apart from the fact that the topic is fun—am I
writing about this as a physicist? Even though knots are things
that can exist in ordinary three-dimensional space, as a physicist
I am only interested in them because of something surprising
that was discovered in the last three decades. Much of the theo-
ry of knots is best understood in the framework of twentieth- and
twenty-first-century developments in quantum physics. In other
words, what really fascinates me are not the knots per se but the
connections between the knots and quantum physics.
The first “knot polynomial” was actually discovered in
1923 by James W. Alexander. Alexander, a Princeton native
who later was one of the original Professors at the Institute,
was a pioneer of algebraic topology. But the story as I will tell
it begins with the Jones polynomial, which was discovered by
Vaughan F. R. Jones in 1983. The Jones polynomial was an
essentially new way of studying knots. Its discovery led to a
flood of new surprises that is continuing to this very day.
Even though it is very modern, and near the frontier of
contemporary mathematics, the Jones polynomial can be described in such a down-to-
earth way that one could explain it to a high school class without compromising very
much. There are not many frontier developments in modern mathematics about which
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The Tunisian revolu-tion of 2011 (al-
thawra al-tunisiya) was the
result of a series of protests
and insurrectional demon-
strations, which started in
December 2010 and
reached culmination on
January 14, 2011, with the
flight of Zine el-Abidine
Ben Ali, the dictator who
had held power for twenty-
three years. It did not
occur in a manner comparable to other revolutions. The army, for instance, did not in-
tervene, nor were there actions of an organized rebellious faction. The demonstrations
were peaceful, although the police used live ammunition, bringing the death toll to more
than one hundred.
The demonstrations began in the town of Sidi Bouzid, west of the country’s geograph-
ical center. On December 17, 2010, a young street vendor set himself on fire following the
confiscation of his wares (fruits and vegetables) by the police. Mohamed Bouazizi was
twenty-six, and he succumbed to his burns on January 4. The next day, five thousand peo-
ple attended his funeral. He became the symbol of the liberation of the Tunisian people
from the despotic rule of the Ben Ali regime. The population, and predominantly the
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Historians today can hardlyanswer the question:
when does history begin?
Traditional boundaries be-
tween history, protohistory,
and prehistory have been
blurred if not completely
erased by the rise of concepts
such as “Big History” and
“macrohistory.” If even the
Big Bang is history, con-
nected to human evolution
and social development
through a chain of geological,
biological, and ecological
events, then the realm of
history, while remaining firmly anthropocentric, becomes all-embracing.
An expanding historical horizon that, from antiquity to recent times, attempts to include
places far beyond the sights of literate civilizations and traditional caesuras between a history
illuminated by written sources and a prehistory of stone, copper, and pots has forced histo-
ry and prehistory to coexist in a rather inelegant embrace. Such a blurring of the boundaries
between those human pasts that left us more or less vivid and abundant written records,
and other pasts, which, on the contrary, are knowable only through the spadework and field-
work of enterprising archaeologists, ethnographers, and anthropologists, has also changed
(or is at least threatening to change) the nature of the work of professional historians.
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Protests in Tunisia culminated when Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali,


























































youth, began to demonstrate with calm determination, in
order to demand the right to work and the right to free
expression.
Certain questions remain enigmatic when it comes to
revolutions in general and to the Tunisian revolution in
particular: How is a revolution born? What are the caus-
es from which a revolution originates, the mechanisms
whereby it is triggered? How does one move from claims
and protests to revolution? The matter is even more
mysterious when one considers the Tunisian revolution.
How is it, for instance, that the Tunisian people, long
silent under the burden of oppression, suddenly rose in
revolt? This revolution was unexpected. It surprised
everybody, including the very actors involved in it and
those who led it. There are revolutions, in other words,
but there is no theory of revolution. The Tunisian exam-
ple will have to be studied the way one studies the
French revolution, the Russian revolution, and so forth,
and taught for what it is in itself, for its singularity and its
exemplarity.
__________________
Over the course of General Ben Ali’s rule, the minimal
conditions did not exist to exercise citizenship, political
engagement, or union activism. The regime controlled
everything and left no possibility open for expressing
any discontent. Public opinion was muzzled and censor-
ship was omnipresent.
Ben Ali’s hold on power and exercise of it had become
increasingly centralized and personalized, reducing to the
barest minimum the role and function of the political
institutions (parliament was no more than a recording
chamber), the juridical apparatus (the courts were at the
order of the dictator, with unjust trials and verdicts), and
the public administration (corruption, nepotism, and so
forth). The omnipotence of the executive branch was
crushing the country and stifled all political play, reduc-
ing all forms of plurality to naught. The president’s party
(the “Constitutional Democratic Rally” or RCD) was
essentially the state, and its interests came before the
general interest. The state served the increasing private
wealth of the president and the family of his wife, which
constituted, according to the American ambassador in
Tunisia, a “quasi-mafia.” The president of the RCD was
the President of the Republic, and he named all the
members of the political leadership, from the federations
to the local sections of the party.
All this led to the frustration of a population that was
constantly subjected to intimidation, to the most blatant
forms of injustice, and to feeling increasingly offended,
yet with no outlet to express any discontent. No one
could denounce injustice or call for justice to be done.
The well-policed system of control had managed to nor-
malize an entire society, using the most cruel means of
repression: no respect for the most basic rules of law, the
fabrication of false evidence, iniquitous judgments,
defective legal procedures, harsh sentences, and of
course torture, the use of which was rampant.
__________________
External observers often pointed to the relative economic
success of the Tunisian state. Some went so far as to speak
of a “Tunisian miracle” with an alleged growth rate of 4–5
percent. In fact, this was known to not be true. Addition-
ally, it was known that the relative economic prosperity of
the country only benefited a small minority, who enjoyed
exorbitant fiscal privileges and made massive use of illegal
means in order to rob public goods and the resources of the
land. Important public enterprises were privatized and sold
at derisory prices; private enterprises were created and
financed with public funds, and so forth. What ensued was
that a wealthy minority (around 10 percent of the popula-
tion) disposed of a third of the GNP, whereas the poorest
Tunisians (30 percent of the population) had to make do
with less than a tenth of the GNP. Unemployment affect-
ed 15 to 20 percent of the population, and among educat-
ed youth it reached 30 percent.
Beyond social inequalities, there were also regional
inequalities and disparities. Indeed, economic develop-
ment, real-estate investment, and tourism were all con-
centrated around the capital, Tunis, and the coastal
regions of the North East and of the Sahel. The interior
regions remained rural zones of extreme poverty dispro-
portionately affected by unemployment; whence a pro-
found sense of injustice that was constantly manifested
by the inhabitants of these areas. It is no accident that
the demonstrations and the demands made by protestors
emerged from Sidi Bouzid, a disfavored, rural, and poor
region in the interior.
__________________
Where is justice in all of this? Why did the Tunisian
demonstrators deploy such strong slogans: “Freedom,”
“Work,” and “Dignity”? These slogans have received a
considerable echo among the population, mobilizing
individuals everywhere, in all the cities, towns, and
regions. Such are the first questions that come to mind
when seeking to understand the themes and motivations
that were at the origin of this “spontaneous” revolution.
In Tunisia, there was an undeniable problem of dis-
tributive justice: all Tunisians did not benefit from eco-
nomic development. A privileged group monopolized
the resources of the country. For a short while, the mid-
dle class was able to draw some advantages from eco-
nomic growth, but the recent economic crisis rendered
its buying power more fragile and uncertain.
Where the rule of law and the most elementary moral
values are transgressed or violated, where gestures and
signs of deference, of consideration, and of respect are
neglected, and where the dignity of individuals is
denied, then justice has been replaced with injustice.
Indications of understanding and of contentment, signs
of approval or acceptance are transformed into screams
of indignation, into gestures of denunciation, into
protest and revolt. The cry “It is unjust!” demands access
into the domain of law. Justice presupposes the princi-
ples of respect and of dignity, whereas injustice engen-
ders humiliation and contempt.
According to Ernst Bloch, “the so-called sense of jus-
tice . . . often reveals itself as composed of the most
diverse feelings and emotions.” The explosion of anger
in Tunisia provides an opportunity to discern what
enters into the mix, what elements compose the drive
for justice. Imperatives of impartiality, equality, and
merit are one aspect of justice, as is the exigency of
respect and dignity for the human being as such, inde-
pendently of his or her social class or regional belonging.
It is impossible in just a few pages to exhaustively cover
the importance of all the elements that compose the
idea of justice. I will limit myself therefore to an analysis
of the central role of respect and of dignity in guaran-
teeing a true social justice.
The concept of respect is surely very complex. One
could say that it is ambiguous and polysemic. It is prox-
imate to esteem, consideration, and deference. Further,
it involves rights as well as persons. The imperative is to
recognize the individual person as having inalienable
rights and obligations.
The most evident link between justice and respect
appears quite clearly in the work of John Rawls, for whom
the notion of respect occupies a central place in his theo-
ry of justice as equality. According to Rawls, respect is a
basic condition that is guaranteed by the principles of jus-
tice in a well-ordered society. What is at stake is in fact
“self-respect,” considered to be a primary good, perhaps
the most important good in Rawls’s eyes. Hence, “a desir-
able feature of a conception of justice is that it should
publicly express men’s respect for one another.”
In order to analyze in more depth the question of
respect, it is important to distinguish “self-respect” from
“self-esteem.” This distinction is important for someone
like Paul Ricoeur who argues in The Just both that “there
is a bond of mutual implication between self-esteem and
the ethical evaluation of those of our actions that aim at
the ‘good life,’” and that “there is a bond between self-
respect and the moral evaluation of these same actions,
submitted to the test of the universalization of our max-
ims of action.” Thus, Ricoeur continues, “taken togeth-
er, self-esteem and self-respect define the ethical and
moral dimension of selfhood, to the extent that they
characterize human beings as subjects of ethico-juridical
imputation.” Ultimately, “we ourselves are worthy of
esteem or respect insofar as we are capable of esteeming
as good or bad, or as declaring permitted or forbidden,
the actions either of others or of ourselves.”
Ricoeur’s distinction could prove useful toward under-
standing better the reaction of the Tunisian population
that was offended and humiliated by an oppressive
regime, which totally failed to demonstrate respect and
consideration. Indeed, Ricoeur argues, self-respect must
be considered as “the fact of defending one’s rights, to
resist everything that can trample them, to refuse to be
used, manipulated, exploited or degraded.” Self-respect,
when dismissed or denied, incites one to refuse all humil-
iation and provokes indignation, protest, and revolt.
From these limited reflections, I would propose an
understanding of social justice that always involves what
I would call an ethics of respect: respect of individual and
collective rights, respect of procedures, and so forth.
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IN THE TUNISIAN REVOLU-
TION, THE YOUTH, MOST PAR-
TICULARLY THE UNEMPLOYED
EDUCATED, PLAYED A CRUCIAL
ROLE, FIRST IN TRIGGERING
THE DEMONSTRATIONS, AND
THEN BY SUSTAINING AND
STRENGTHENING THE REVOLT.
TUNISIAN REVOLUTION (Continued from page 1)
ALSO CRITICAL WAS THE
FUNCTION OF NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES OF INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATION, AND
OF SOCIAL NETWORKS SUCH
AS THE INTERNET, FACE-
BOOK, AND TO A LESSER
EXTENT TWITTER.
The army did not intervene in the Tunisian revolution, nor were













This ethics of respect must be found at the basis of any
social contract, of any political pact capable of grounding
a democratic regime, and of any state with a rule of law
worthy of that name.
The Tunisian revolution has shown that respect
necessitates the establishment of political institutions
that will guarantee the protection of dignity and the fun-
damental rights of citizens. One of the major lessons of
this revolution is that the Tunisian people, prior to
demanding economic, social, or cultural rights, first
made a claim for their fundamental right to freedom, to
respect, and to dignity. The basic right to be respected is
the necessary condition enabling each Tunisian citizen
to establish him or herself as a subject of rights, for him
or her to be considered as a person capable of participat-
ing in the construction of a political space in which
equality and “difference” (ikhtilâf) are both legitimated
and guaranteed by the rule of law.
__________________
Freedom is first of all a conquest—such is one of the
major lessons to draw from the Tunisian revolution.
However, once won, freedom must be exercised and put
to the test of reality. This requires the elaboration of a
legal order, which determines the conditions of free-
dom’s exercise and the spheres within which it can be
realized. At stake are in fact borders. Freedom ends
where the freedom of others begins, as the old saying
goes. The drawing of borders between the different pow-
ers (executive, legislative, and judiciary), between the
sphere of the state and that of the ruling party or civil
society, follows a similar logic. This art of separation must
be institutionalized, but it requires consultation and
public debate, as well as a collective learning, all of
which constitute the necessary conditions to establish
the rule of law.
But what precisely is the role that law must play in
order to ensure the transition from an insurrectional sit-
uation toward a process of democratic transition?
One knows that the legal order of the old regime has
been de facto revoked. That is a consequence of the rev-
olution. The entirety of its juridical apparatus must
therefore be put in question, because it has completely
lost its legitimacy, because it was established on an
unjust basis and unjust principles. The constitution, the
electoral law, the law of the press, and more have all
served the dictatorship and its staying power instead of
the general interest or the popular will. That is why it is
necessary to dismantle the juridical apparatus in order to
build, from the ground up, a new and just legal order that
will draw its legitimacy from the principles of the revo-
lution. That is the task assigned to the High Commis-
sion for Political Reforms, at the head of which is the
Tunisian jurist Yadh Ben Achour.
The new legal order also must not be severed from
the social order, which is by definition heterogeneous
and affected by many kinds of contradictions, differences
(ikhtilâfât), and struggles. These must be translated in
order for the law to be legitimate. What is therefore
required is a new social contract and a new political
covenant, which must assume and ratify these differ-
ences, and which must involve the elaboration of viable
political compromises that include all political group-
ings, all movements, all components of society.
The process of transition requires the institutionaliza-
tion of conflict, the establishment of new legitimate pow-
ers, and the definition of new rules for the political game:
procedures of universal suffrage founded on the sover-
eignty of the people, the selection of the voting system
toward the organization of elections (majority or propor-
tional representation), the nature of the political regime
(presidential, parliamentary), and so forth. All these
questions must be the object of contradictory debates,
consultations, and compromises involving the entirety of
the nation’s living forces, and not a limited coterie of
technocrats or experts (no matter how competent).
And yet, one cannot help but notice that there
remain many zones of opacity in the current process of
transition. For it requires the shaping of a juridical form
in order to institutionalize the gains of the revolution and
to determine the new sites of power. Based on the avail-
able information, some of the first decisions made by the
provisional government failed to involve any true con-
sultation. For example, the nomination of the new gov-
ernors was the result of a unilateral decision by the
Interior Minister. Similarly, the nominations of some
ambassadors by the Foreign Affairs Minister were per-
formed in a spirit of continuity with the old regime. In
both cases, and in others as well, such decisions have pro-
voked an angry reaction from the population: people
have expressed their opposition with protests and
demonstrations. In some regions, they gathered in front
of the governors’ offices in order to demand the immedi-
ate departure of newly named governors. They succeed-
ed. Following his own strong positions (and probably to
appease the tensions), the Interior Minister decided to
“freeze the activities of the RCD” until its dissolution by
legal judgment, according to the required procedure.
It seems clear (as I write this) that the popular will
continues to play its role as a counter-power in order to
preserve the gains of the revolution and to change the
anti-democratic practices of the old regime. One can
only hope that these practices of resistance continue to
accompany the process of transition, in order to ensure
the passage from revolution to a truly democratic rule of
law. The future of the revolutionary process will depend
on the popular will and its readiness to exercise control
over the choices and the orientations (institutional,
political, economic, etc.) that will be ratified over the
course of this transition period.
The revolution turned out to be a formidable moment
in the quest for freedom and for dignity. In the transition
from revolution to the exercise of freedom and of democ-
racy, law must play a crucial role. There were no doubt
abuses and failures with regard to law, but overall the
Tunisian people were careful to act within a legal frame,
while advancing a new, revolutionary legitimacy.
Let us hope that the Tunisian people will walk on the
path of freedom and of dignity without falling by the
wayside, or suffering that which they have already suf-
fered enough. 
Translated by Gil Anidjar, Member in the School of Social
Science
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THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES
PROVIDED AN ENVIRONMENT
FOR THE EXERCISE OF
CRITIQUE WITH A TEMPORALITY
(REAL TIME) AND A VIRTUAL
LOCATION (THE NETWORK)
THAT ESCAPE TRADITIONAL
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WIDEN THE MOVEMENT, AND
TO GIVE THE REVOLUTION A
NATIONAL AND EVEN INTER-
NATIONAL DIMENSION.
The Tunisian people first made a claim for their fundamental
right to freedom, to respect, and to dignity.
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